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Though computers were first developed in the mid-1940's, the need
for copyright protection of computer programs did not arise until the
1960's. The reason is simple. The earliest computers were programmed
by hand-setting electrical switches. Although the large mainframe computers of the 1950's and 1960's used software programs, the programs
were custom-developed to meet the specific needs of each user. Only
with the revolution in semiconductor technology in the 1970's, making
small and inexpensive computers possible, did the market for computer
programs expand to encompass small businesses and individual users.
t
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This expansion made it impossible to produce customized programs for
each user. An era of commercial software had arrived, and with it came
the need for new methods of protecting the programs now sold as consumer products. Trade secret and licensing agreements had been effective for producers of software when users were closely tied to
manufacturers for software and other support services, but the mass
marketing of programs generally rendered both methods of protection
ineffective.' While some software producers have sought patent protection for their programs, this approach has not been promising. In 1966,
the President's Commission on the Patent System recommended that
patent protection not be extended to computer programs primarily because of the anticipated administrative burden on the Patent Office. 2
Though patent protection for programs is available, few programs meet
the novelty and other requirements imposed under patent law. 3 This
leaves copyright as the favored system for protecting commercial computer programs.
In 1964, the Copyright Office began registering computer programs
under the rule of doubt. 4 In 1974, as part of its work to amend the
Copyright Act of 1909 (the 1909 Act), Congress established the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) to make recommendations for the protection of copyrighted
works when used in conjunction with computers.5 In 1976, Congress
1. Trade secret protection depends on the ability of the proprietor of the secret to
maintain its secrecy. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). When programs are sold commercially, it may be hard to show that they remain, and are intended
to remain, secrets. But see Milgrim, Software in Search of Protection, 1 COMPUTER L.
REP. 554, 556 (1983).
2. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, "To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS
OF... USEFUL ARTS" IN AN AGE OF EXPLODING TECHNOLOGY 14 (1966).
3. In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981), the Supreme Court established that
some computer programs are entitled to patent protection. Some computer programs
have been granted patent protection. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983). The extent of patentability for computer programs remains unclear. See Davidson, Protecting Computer
Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 339, 348-60 (1983); Rose, Protection of Intellectual PropertyRights in Computers and Computer Programs: Recent Developments, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 547 (1982).
4. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER
PROGRAMS (1964), reprinted in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y U.S.A. 361 (1964).
5. The National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) was created in 1974 to:
study and compile data on: (1) the reproduction and use of copyrighted works of
authorship: (A) in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing,
processing, retrieving, and transferring information, and (B) by various forms of
machine reproduction, not including reproduction by or at the request of instructors for use in face-to-face teaching activities; and (2) the creation of new works
by the application or intervention of such automatic systems or machine
reproduction.
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passed the Copyright Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act). While the 1976 Act
made no explicit reference to computer programs, the legislative history
made clear Congress' intent to include programs within the category of
copyrightable "literary works."'6 In 1978, CONTU submitted its Final
Report recommending two changes in the 1976 Act: a definition of
"computer program", and a limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright owners in computer programs. 7 These recommendations were
adopted by Congress in the Copyright Act of 1980 (the 1980 Act).8 Together, the 1976 Act and the 1980 Act presumably bring computer programs within the realm of copyright subject matter. What remains
uncertain is the extent of copyright protection for computer programs
and whether all programs are to receive equal protection. This ambiguity in the scope of copyright protection derives largely from the nature
of computer programs.
I.

COMPUTER PROGRAMS AND COPYRIGHT:
THE PROBLEM

Computer programs are developed in stages. In the first stage, the
programmer usually creates a flow chart, descriptive materials, or other
writings in the process of developing in algorithm (the specific steps a
computer follows in performing an assigned task). For instance, if the
task is to calculate the acreage and price of different parcels of real estate, the computer must obtain its data from a predetermined memory
location or the keyboard, perform specific operations on those data, and
display or store the results so they can be retrieved by the user. After
the algorithm has been created, the programmer writes the program
code, usually in a high-level programming language such as Pascal,
In addition, the Commission was to "make recommendations as to such changes in copyright law or procedures that may be necessary to assure for such purposes access to copyrighted works, and to provide recognition of the rights of copyright owners." S. 3976, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. § 201, 120 CONG. REC. 30, 516 (1974), reprinted in NATIONAL COMM'N ON
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHT WORKS, 1978 FINAL REPORT 105 [hereinafter
cited as CONTU, FINAL REPORT].
6. The 1976 Copyright Act's definition of literary work is set forth at 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982), as amended: "[Works] expressed in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical
symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are embodied."
Congress has classified computer programs as literary works: "The term 'literary
works'. . . includes catalogues, directories, and similar factual, reference, or instructional
works and compilations of data. It also includes computer data bases, and computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of
original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas themselves." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d. Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5667
[hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
7. CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 12.
8. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982).
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FORTRAN, LISP, or BASIC.9 Alternatively, the program may be written in Assembly language.1 0 Finally, the program is translated by yet
another program into the machine code,11 the binary (high and low
voltage) signals on which the computer actually operates. 12 These signals can be stored temporarily in Random Access Memory (RAM) or
more permanently on disks, tapes, punch cards, or in Read Only Memory (ROM) chips. 13 When written in a high-level programming language the program is called source code and can be read and interpreted
by a human being with only a modicum of training. When written in
machine code it is practically unintelligible even to those trained in
programming.
This transformation of a computer program from source code to
machine code, from a "writing" in the literal sense to a code embodied
in high and low voltage states, challenges our traditional notion of the
nature of copyrightable writings. While all other copyrighted works are
created primarily to be perceived by human beings, computer programs
are often entirely invisible to those who use them.14 In fact, many users
would be appalled at the idea of purusing the thousands of lines of code
which make up a spreadsheet or a word processing program. Other literary works,' 5 such as novels or poetry, are reproduced and sold for the
9. These high-level computer languages allow the programmer to write English-like
instructions which describe the problem-solving process in steps very much like those a
human would take.
10. Assembly language instructions are highly abbreviated codes such as "MOV C,A"
or "JMP" which describe the problem-solving process in terms of the specific operations
taken by the CPU as it moves data from memory to a temporary register, operates on the
data, and "reads" the next instruction. Assembly language is hardware specific; each
microprocessor has its own set of assembly language instructions.
11. This translation from source code to machine code is performed by a compiler,
interpreter, or assembler program, depending on the type of source code language used by
the programmer.
12. The machine code is held in the computer in the form of high and low voltage
electric currents. The object code uses "O's" and "I's" to represent these high and low
voltages. The object code should not be confused with the machine code. Only the
machine code can be directly used by the computer; it is the machine code which instructs
the CPU as to what operations to perform.
13. RAM is similar to ROM but holds information on a temporary basis only. Disks
and tapes hold information in the form of magnetized spots which are "read" by the computer as a sensitive head is passed over the magnetized areas. A ROM chip is an array of
transistor or other switches set permanently to high or low voltage states.
14. Many computer programs are sold in copy-protected forms; that is, technical
means have been used to prevent the user of the program from making machine-usable
copies of the program or from being able to read the program code. Only by using a logic
analyzer or microcomputer development machine can one "read" the electrical impulses
of the program as they pass through the CPU and thus gain access to the program code.
15. Computer programs have been classified by Congress as literary works. See supra
note 6.
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express purpose of being read. Sculpture is intended to be seen and
even felt, painting to be seen, and music to be heard or read. No copyrighted expression, apart from computer programs, is sold to the public
in a form in which the copyrighted expression is unavailable as such to
the purchaser.
There is another difference between programs and other copyrighted works. Programs are created, first and foremost, to do work.
They are used to perform calculations, search data files, control fuel injection systems in automobiles, and run factory assembly lines. No
other form of copyrighted writing performs work in quite this way. It is
true that all forms of copyrighted subject matter have some function.
We may use music to alter our moods, books for education, or movies
for entertainment. But in all of those uses the copyrighted work communicates something to the user, a human being. In contrast, computer
programs "communicate" to computers, thereby causing the computers
to perform work human beings would otherwise have to perform. Not
only do programs do work, they do work in an entirely new manner. It
is the program itself, the copyrighted literary work, which, when fed
into a computer, performs the work.
These characteristics of computer programs are disturbing because
they challenge a number of the basic axioms of copyright law and hence
raise questions about the scope of copyright protection for computer
programs. One such axiom is that copyright does not extend to utilitarian objects. 16 Copyright and patent, despite some overlap, are conceptually different domains, the first granting a limited monopoly to
authors in their writings and the second granting quite a different set of
monopoly rights to inventors in their discoveries. 17 When computer
programs begin to look more like machine parts than traditional literary works, it is unclear how far the copyright in the writing should extend to the utilization of the program as an invention.
Another axiom of copyright law is that copyright protects an author's expression (that original aspect of the work created) from exploitation by others. Central to the copyright system is the notion of a
copy. It is over copies of his work that the copyright owner has control,
and it is his prerogative to prevent, limit, or otherwise exploit the reproduction, display, performance, distribution and sale of copies of that
work. Thus, one of the basic questions in copyright law is whether one
work is a copy of another. This question is especially important in the
case of computer programs for two reasons. First, the transformation
from human-readable source code to machine-usable code raises the
question of whether the machine code is a copy of the source code pro16. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
17. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 8.
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gram. If it is not, a copyright in the source code will not protect the
program in its machine code form from unauthorized reproduction.
Second, we must decide whether a program embodied on a ROM chip or
other medium of fixation is protected as a copy of the program. Must a
copy of the program display or otherwise make available the copyrighted expression to the user, or can the program be sold in machine
code versions and still be fully protected under copyright law?
Part II of this Article will explore the question of whether machine
code versions of a program are copies of the source code version under
current copyright law. In asking whether machine code versions are
copies of the original source code, this Article considers both the relationship between source and machine codes and the form that machine
code takes when held in ROM or on some other medium of fixation.
After determining that machine code can be considered a copy of the
source program for copyright purposes, this Article examines whether
copies, to be protected under copyright law, must fulfill some communicative function-that is, whether they must allow the program user to
read the copyrighted program. For policy reasons, Part II concludes
that machine code versions of the program which fail to meet such a
communicative function test should not be protected under copyright
law.
Part III of this Article focuses on the question of whether all computer programs are equally copyrightable. Under current technology,
computer programs fall into several functional categories: applications
programs; operating system programs; compiler, assembler, and interpreter programs; and special-purpose machine control programs. Applications programs are designed to allow the computer user to perform a
specific task, such as balancing a checkbook, playing a videogame, performing a data base search, or writing a novel. Operating system programs control the inner workings of the computer. They allow the
central processing unit (CPU) to interact with peripheral devices such
as the disk drive, keyboard, and cathode ray terminal, and to control
the flow of data and instructions within the machine. Compiler, assembler, and interpreter programs translate the human-readable source
code and data into machine code.18 While some of these programs produce copyrightable output, and thus appear to perform some communicative role, other programs, such as operating system programs, produce
no recognizable output for the computer user. They control the
machine, functioning much as a machine part in that they allow the
18. Technically speaking, compiler, interpreter, and assembler programs are not part
of the operating system; however, they have been grouped with operating system programs in recent litigation. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F.

Supp. 812, 815-16 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S.
Ct. 690 (1984).
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computer to run applications programs.

Are all of these programs

equally copyrightable, or should some programs be given only limited
copyright protection because they are utilitarian in nature? Part III
concludes that operating system and other utilitarian programs should
be given only limited copyright protection so that the copyright owner
cannot use his copyright to obtain a patent-like monopoly over the utilitarian function of the program.
II.

WHAT.CONSTITUTES A COPY OF A
COMPUTER PROGRAM?
A.

SOURCE CODE AND MACHINE CODE

The first step in determining the nature of the protected expression
in a program is to establish the relationship between source code and
machine code. Machine code has been characterized by CONTU and
the courts as a copy of the source code. 19 Most certainly it is some sort
of translation. 20 If, for copyright purposes, the machine code is a copy
of the source code, then the protected element in the machine code
must be that which the machine and source codes have in common.
What is machine code and how does it relate to the source code from
which it is derived?
Machine code is not a letter-for-letter or word-for-word encoding of
the source code, but is instead a translation of instructions from humanreadable programming language form to binary object code form.21 The
CPU of the computer can do little more than "read", "write", "add",
"jump", "halt", and "compare. ' 22 Combinations of these primitive oper19. In his dissent to the majority report, Commissioner Hersey stated that the Commission had originally thought of programs in their machine-usable form as derivative
works but abandoned that characterization when it realized the "invalidity of th[e] suggestion." CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 32. The Commission then shifted to categorizing machine code versions as copies of the source code program. Id.
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a derivative work as follows:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work".
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The owner of copyright has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982). It remains unclear
why CONTU refused to consider machine-usable versions as derivative works based upon
the original source code version of a computer program.
20. Because the source code is automatically transformed by a compiler, interpreter,
or assembler program into machine code, that code is intimately and directly related to
the source code version.
21. See supra note 12.
22. "Read" allows the CPU to receive data from memory or another source; "write"
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ations allow the 8085 microprocessor, for example, to respond to seventy-eight different "assembly language" instructions. 23 Every program
written in source code is ultimately and necessarily transformed into
strings of these primitive instructions, encoded in binary form, on which
the computer operates. 24 In this translation to machine code much of
the original source code program may be lost. The programmer's commentary, which is useful for understanding all but the most simple program, is eliminated altogether. 25 In some cases other elements of the
source code are not represented in the machine code version. As a result, when translated back into source code by "reverse" compiling, the
original and translated source code versions, despite strong similarities,
may also have noticeable differences.
What the source code and machine code have in common, then, is
not the specific literary expression chosen by the programmer, but a
general structure and specific strategies for bringing about an intended
result. These common elements might be identified as variables, procedures, subroutines, and other steps or structures adopted in constructing a program. Some commentators have suggested that these elements
be protected by copyright just as the characters, incidents, and other elements of a novel or play are protected. 26 No court has yet addressed
this issue.
In some cases there is a third version of the program, the copyrightable output produces when the program is placed in the computer.
Sometimes that output is almost identical with large portions of the
program. This is true in computer-aided instruction and other text-producing programs where large portions of the program are text to be displayed to the user. In other cases, there is an equally strong correlation
allows it to send data out to memory or another peripheral device; "add" allows the
microprocessor to combine two binary values in the accumulator; "jump" instructs the
CPU to access an instruction other than the next one in series; "halt" brings the CPU to a
halt; and "compare" allows the CPU to compare two binary values. Other operations are
constructed out of these basic functions.
23. P. HoRowITz & W. HILL, LABORATORY MANUAL FOR THE ART OF ELECTRONIcs B-

4 to B-6 (1981).
24.

For example, the Pascal instruction "Read(x)" (where x is some character typed

into the keyboard) must be translated into a series of machine code instructions that tell
the computer to go to the input port (the keyboard), take the character (now encoded as a

series of O's and 1's), and place it in memory where it can later be accessed.
25.

The programmer's commentary is, in essence, a set of notes written into the pro-

gram which remind the programmer (and explain to any other reader) what different
variables represent, the purpose of different sections of the program, and the steps being
taken to solve the overall programming problem.
26. Davidson, The Importance of Being Apple, 2 COMPUTER L. REP. 388, 390 (1983);
Davidson, Apple v. Franklin: Facing Up to the UtilitarianPurpose Problem, 1 COMPUTER
L. REP. 754, 760-61 (1983); Pierce, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs,30 CopY-

RIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1, 11 (1983).
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between the program code and output, except that the output is not
text but rather a graphic display, musical composition, or even a spoken
voice. Does the copyright in the program extend to the copyrightable
output and is that output a copy of the program?
A few courts have addressed this question in the context of arcadestyle videogames. In Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,27 the plaintiff
had copyrighted the audiovisual aspects of his game, but not the underlying program. Responding to the defendant's contention that the only
proper subject matter for copyright protection was the computer program which "determines the sights and sounds of the game's audiovisual display," the court held that a copyright in the program would not
prevent a competitor from reproducing the exact audiovisual effects
simply by writing a new computer program. 28 In Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Strohon,29 the plaintiff had obtained copyrights for both the
audiovisual output and underlying program. The court considered the
computer program and audiovisual display to be distinct creations "not
so 'intertwined' as to prevent their separate consideration. '30 Relying
on Stern Electronics, the court explained that:
[I]t is quite possible to design a game that would infringe Midway's audiovisual copyright but would use an entirely different computer program. The converse possibility . . .that a game's computer program

but not its audiovisuals could be an infringement, is not foreclosed as a
matter of logic and should not be as a matter of policy. The skill, ingenuity and effort that is required to design the computer program which
operates the game is altogether different from the process
of conceiving
31
and designing the distinctive PAC-MAN characters.
The court concluded that the videogame audiovisual display and the
computer program that produced that display were separately copyrightable and that while defendant's display was not sufficiently similar
to the PAC-MAN display to constitute an infringement, the computer
program which produced that display did infringe Midway's copyright
32
in the program that controlled the PAC-MAN.
This solution is not altogether satisfying. While an audiovisual
work may be independently conceived by an artist and then translated
into program code, often it is the programmer who first creates and
fixes the audiovisual display in writing the program, much as a painter
creates and fixes his images with brush and paint. Separating the pro27. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
28. Id. at 855. Commissioner Nimmer believed that audiovisual work is not eligible
for copyright protection because it is not fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 27.
29. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. -1983).
30. Id at 749.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 742.
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gram from its copyrightable output produces a "chinese box" effect,
with the audiovisual display fixed in a copyrightable program which in
turn is fixed in a ROM, on a disk, or on paper.3 3 When the output is a
literary work contained within the program or appended to it as a file,
this separation of program and output is even less acceptable. Perhaps
the copyrightable output should be considered a derivative work of the
program, protected, at least in part, by the copyright in the program.
Whether or not this solution is adopted in the future, the courts have
clearly rejected any claim that the program's output is a copy of the
program.
Thus the source code, the set of statements or instructions that
make up the program, is the copyright-protected expression within a
program. But copyright protection is not confined to the precise wording and sequence of the source code. Variables, procedures, subroutines,
and other programming elements are also the author's original creation
and can be protected in both the source code and machine code translation. There are several reasons for treating machine code as a copy of
the original source code. First, traditional copyright treatment of literary works recognizes that the author's creation extends to the characters, incidents, and other elements of his story.3 4 Second, machine code
is a mechanical translation of the source code. Whatever it contains is
and must be derived from the original work of authorship. Third, and
most important, unless copyright protection extends to the machine-usable versions of programs, those versions can be misappropriated without any danger of infringing the copyright in the source code program.
B. ARE ROM CHIPS COPIES OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS?
Some courts and commentators have argued that machine-usable
programs, embodied on disks, tapes, or ROM chips, should be excluded
from copyright protection because they are really machine parts which
control the functioning of the computer. Commissioner Hersey, in his
dissent to the CONTU Final Report, argued that:
[Program]instructions themselves eventually become an essential part
of the machinery that produces the results. They may become (in chip
or hardware form) a permanent part of the actual machinery; or they
may become interchangeable parts, or tools, insertable into and removable from the machine. In whatever material form, the machine-control phase of the program, when activated, enters into the computer's
33. According to the Second Circuit, copyright is not "defeated because the audiovisual work and the computer program are both embodied in the same components of the
game. The same thing occurs when an audio tape embodies both a musical composition
and a sound recording." Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 856 (2d Cir. 1982).
34. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 298
U.S. 669 (1936).
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mechanical process. This is a device capable of commanding a series of
gates of the computer in
impulses which open and close the electronic
35
such order as to produce the desired result.
The CONTU majority agreed that computer programs serve such a utilitarian purpose but denied that this was any basis for withholding copyright protection from the program itself. The program and the machine
processes are distinct. Copyright protects only the program. Anyone is
36
Others have
free to make the computer perform the same processes.
is fixed,
program
the
machine-usable
focused on the medium in which
37
the
quintessential
is
it
is
argued,
Here,
particularly ROM chips.
machine part, an electrical circuit made up of transistor or other
switches. Since electrical circuits are not, in general, copyrightable,
how can a silicon chip, which is nothing but an array of such circuits, be
copyrightable?
The district court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp.38 questioned the copyrightability of programs held in ROM.
Judge Newcomer expressed considerable concern over whether the
programmer, in writing the program, was really writing a set of instructions or merely planning the lay-out of circuitry. In the first case, he
felt, the program would be a separate, copyrightable work fixed in a
ROM chip. In the latter case, the program might be no more than an
39
audiovisual work (the chip design) or a piece of engineering work.
Other courts have viewed the ROM chip as a mere medium of fixation
40
which meets the statutory requirement of fixation under the 1976 Act.
As such, the copyright does not extend to the chip or the circuit design,
just as the copyright in a book does not extend to the paper, binding, or
cover.
ROM circuitry, under current technology, is standardized and gen35. CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 28 (emphasis in original).
36. Id. at 20.
37. See Aufrichtig, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programsin Read Only Memory, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329 (1982); Nilles, Copyright Protectionfor Programs Stored in
Computer Chips: Competing with IBM and Apple, 7 HAMLINE L. REV. 103 (1984); Stern,
Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software: Did the 1980 Act do Anything for Object Code?, 3 COMPUTER/L.J. 1 (1981); Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program
Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (1983).

38. 545 F. Supp. 812, 822 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The court in Data Cash Sys. v. JS & A
Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066-70 (N.D. Ill. 1979) ruled that a program held in ROM
was not a copy of the source code program under either the common law or the 1909 Act.
This holding was compelled, the court argued, under the rule of White-Smith Publishing
Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908). White-Smith was subsequently overruled by the
Copyright Act of 1976. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
39. Apple v. Franklin, 545 F. Supp. at 822.
40. See Williams Elecs. Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982); Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Tandy Corp. v. Personal
Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
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erally unpatentable. 4 1 Programmers merely designate the high and low
voltages they want at each addressable switch, and the chip manufacturer produces the chip as designated. 42 There is no need for the
programmer to plan the layout of the chip any more than an author
needs to worry about the mechanisms of setting type or the chemical
interaction of ink and paper. Thus, copyright in a program prevents
only the replication of the configuration of on and off switches which
holds or represents a particular program, just as the copyright in a book
prevents the replication of the precise sequence of letters, spaces, and
punctuation marks that make up the text. It does not confer a copyright on ROM chips per se and could not be used to prevent the reproduction of a ROM chip if that chip, while holding identical high and low
voltage values, represented the machine-usable version of a different
43
program.
Still, some might protest that protecting the programs held in ROM
is only a step away from granting copyright protection to hard-wired
circuitry. After all, programs were originally introduced into computers
by a combination of hard-wiring and hand-setting the switches that
made up the program. Any program can, with sufficient time and energy, be produced by creating a sequence of different electrical circuits.
ROMs are only a convenient, manufactured form of these circuits.
Once we recognize that circuitry can hold a program-that is, a set of
instructions-what is to prevent us from extending copyright protection
to the electrical circuits which "instruct" room lights to turn on or off
or which "instruct" an automobile engine to start?
Such questions are speculative at best. The 1980 Act places distinct
brakes on any such descent along the slippery slope into the world of
utilitarian objects and patent by limiting computer programs to "statement[s] of instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result." 44 This definition excludes electric light or ignition switches and all other forms of circuitry not used
"directly or indirectly" in a computer. It excludes the computer itself,
the hardware such as the CPU, and other semiconductor circuits which
41. But see Oxman, Intellectual PropertyProtection and IntegratedCircuitMasks, 20
JuRIMErRics J. 405, 432 (1980).
42. Alternatively, the programmer can use a PROM (Programmable Read Only
Memory) or EPROM (Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory) in which the individual switches can be set by selectively burning out switches using pulses of high voltage.
43. Two ROM chips may hold identical arrays of switches set to identical high and
low positions yet represent the machine-usable version of two different programs. This is
possible because machine code is determined by the architecture of the computer and the
specific operating system that controls the traffic flow from memory to CPU. Two different programs, run through different compilers, might appear to have the same machine
code and yet cause the computer to perform very different tasks.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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make up the computer. 45 Only programs, the sets of instructions used
in the computer to bring about a certain result, can be protected under
copyright law. Given the simple array of switches which make up a
ROM chip, there is no reason to withhold copyright protection from the
program when held in ROM or hard-wired into the computer. Extending copyright protection to the program in that form no more creates a patent-like monopoly over the circuit design than extending
copyright protection to literary works in book form creates a patent-like
monopoly in the art of printing and bookbinding.
C.

MUST COPIES OF A COPYRIGHTED WORK PERFORM SOME
COMMUNICATIVE FUNCTION?

To qualify as a copy of a copyrighted work, it may not be sufficient
that the reproduction contain the copyrighted expression of the original. Some courts and commentators claim that a reproduction must
communicate the copyrighted expression to be protected as a copy of
the original work; others claim that the copy must communicate something but it need not be the copyright-protected expression; and others
deny that there is any communication requirement. 46 The debate is of
particular importance for the computer software industry because copies of programs are frequently sold in forms that prevent the program
user from accessing the program code. If copies of programs that do not
communicate the program code to the user are not "copies" for copyright purposes, then others would be free to reproduce and sell those
versions without infringing the author's copyright in the program.
The idea that in order to be copyrightable a work must perform
some communicative function has its origin in the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution which allows Congress to grant to authors "the exclusive right to their . . .writings. ' 47 Until the advent of computer programs, all copyrightable writings were primarily, if not entirely,
communicative works. Neither Congress nor the courts has had to address the question of whether an otherwise copyrightable writing which
does not communicate its protected expression to a human audience is a
"writing" within the meaning of the Constitution. However, the constitutional issue may be temporarily avoided if the 1976 Act requires all
copyrighted works to fulfill some communicative function.
Judicial response to the question of whether copies of computer
programs must meet some communicative function test has varied con45. But cf. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 302, 98
Stat. 3335, 3347-56 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C. § 901) (extends copyright protection to mask
works which include microprocessors and other parts of the computer hardware).
46. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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siderably. Some courts have found that programs embedded in ROM
chips do communicate themselves to an audience. That audience, however, is the computer. Thus, in Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc.,48 the court concluded that "the imprinting of a computer
program on a silicon chip, which then allows the computer to read the
program and act upon its instructions" fulfilled the statutory requirement that copyrighted works be fixed in a "tangible medium of expression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise

'49
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
In direct conflict with the Tandy court, the district court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. insisted that "copyright is limited to material that can claim an underlying expressive or
communicative purpose" and that the expression must be directed to a
human audience. 50 However, the district court indicated that the communication requirement could be fulfilled by any expressive function
and need not be a communication of the copyrighted program. 51 The
Third Circuit, in reversing the lower court, denied that there was any
requirement that a copy of a program embodied in ROM perform some
communicative role, claiming that any such requirement was eliminated
with the passage of the 1976 Act.52 In so holding, the Third Circuit referred to its opinion in Williams Electronics,Inc. v. Artic International,

Inc.53 where it had argued that for copyright purposes a copy is a mate-

rial object in which the copyrighted work is fixed, and that there could
be no further requirement that the copy perform some communicative
role.54 Still other courts have arbitrarily claimed, somewhat metaphysi-

cally, that computer programs must always, and necessarily do, communicate with the user.

55

These courts have based their divergent interpretations of the communication requirement on the 1976 and 1980 Copyright Acts. Is there
some basis in those statutes for harmonizing the cacophony of judicial
tongues?
In its opinion in Apple Computer, Inc. v. FranklinComputer Corp.,
the Third Circuit claimed that any statutory communication requirement was eliminated when the 1976 Act overruled White-Smith Pub48. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
49. Id. at 173; accord Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 751 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
50. 545 F. Supp. 812, 824 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 825.

52.
53.
54.
55.

714 F.2d at 1248.
685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 877.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 780 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
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lishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 56 That the 1976 Act overturned White-Smith is
incontrovertible. 5 7 That it eliminated any statutory basis for requiring
copies of a copyrighted work to communicate the protected expression
to a human audience is far from certain.
In White-Smith, the Supreme Court considered whether a piano
roll, the perforated sheet that, in conjunction with a player piano, produces music, infringed the plaintiff's copyright in two musical compositions. The issue was not whether the piano rolls reproduced plaintiff's
music, but whether they were copies of the musical compositions. The
Court held that the piano rolls were not infringing copies on the theory
that:
"A copy is that which comes so near to the original as to give to every
person seeing it the idea created by the original."
Various definitions have been given by the experts called in the
case. The one which most commands itself to our judgment ... defines a copy of a musical composition to be a "written or
printed record of it in intelligible notation." It may be true that in a
broad sense a mechanical instrument which reproduces a tune copies it;
but this is a strained and artificial meaning. . . . These musical tones
are not a copy which appeals to the eye. . .. A musical composition is

an intellectual creation which first exists in the mind of the composer....

It is not susceptible of being copied until it has been put in

the form which others can see and read.5"
Under the "strained and artificial" rule of White-Smith, no reproduction of a copyrighted work was itself a copy unless it was directly visible
to the human eye and intelligible to the human intellect. Phonograph
records, videotapes, floppy disks, and ROM chips would all be excluded
from copyright protection under the doctrine. However, the 1976 Act
defines copyright subject matter as "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. '59 Thus,
the 1976 Act abolishes the requirement that the copyrighted expression
56. Apple v. Franklin, 714 F.2d at 1248 (reviewing impact of Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982), on White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908)).
57. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5665, (new definition of "fixation" in section 101
is "intended to avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from
cases such as White-Smith ....
").
58. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908) (quoting
West v. Francis, 106 Eng. Rep. 1361, 1363 (1822), quoted with approval in Boosey v.
Whight, [1900] 1 Ch. 122, 124 (1899)).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). "Copy" is similarly defined: "'Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982).
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be visible to the eye without the intervention of a machine. It removes
any requirement that it be visible as opposed to audible. However, contrary to the Third Circuit's reading, the 1976 Act does not eliminate the
requirement that a "copy" of a copyrighted work must communicate.
Some courts have interpreted 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 102(a) as requiring only that a copyrighted program be reproduced by the computer as
it operates on the program instructions. 60 Such an interpretation of the
statute removes any requirement that the computer user be able to perceive the copyrighted program. However, the language "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated" (emphasis added) in sections 101
and 102(a) belies such a reading. Rather, it suggests that the words
"perceive" and "reproduce" are intended as a non-exhaustive list of
those means by which the copyrighted work must be communicated.
The legislative history of the 1976 Act provides an even stronger basis
for maintaining that the copyrighted expression must be communicated
to a human audience. In the report accompanying the 1976 Act, the
House of Representatives explained that:
[I]t makes no difference what the form, manner or medium of fixation
may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or
any other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical
object or written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic,
or any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or device. .... 61
The House of Representatives clearly intended that the work be perceivable not to a machine, but to a person by means of a machine. The
perceiving subject, it would appear, must be human.
Perhaps, it might be argued, the amendments made by the 1980 Act
have superseded this reading of the statute. The 1980 Act added a definition of "computer program" to section 101 and a limitation on the
copyright owner's exclusive rights in computer programs in section 117.
Neither section directly speaks to the question of whether copies of a
computer program must communicate the protected expression to their
owner.6 2 However, the CONTU Final Report recommending those
60. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal.
1981); see also Note, supra note 37, at 1731.
61. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5665.
62. While § 117 does not speak directly to the question of what constitutes a copyright-protected copy of a computer program, it limits the rights of the copyright owner by
allowing the owner of a copy of the program to make archival copies, to create copies in
the process of using the program, and to make adaptations of the program. No owner of a
machine-usable copy of a program can effectively exercise the implied right to make copies and adaptations unless he has the ability to read the program code directly from the
disk, ROM, or other storage medium and make alterations on the program in the computer. The CONTU Final Report recommends a liberal interpretation of the right to
make adaptations in a program, including the right to translate it into another high-level
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changes in the copyright statute also contained a discussion of the communication requirement. This is the closest thing we have to a legisla63
tive history of the 1980 Act.

In recommending that copyright protection be fully extended to
computer programs, CONTU relied on Judge Learned Hand's opinion
in Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau,64 which the Commission characterized as "the 'touchstone' for interpreting the constitutional writings
requirement. '65 Reiss concerned the validity of a copyright in a code
book containing 6,325 coined five-letter words, all of which were pronouncable, but none of which had any specific meaning. Purchasers of
the code book could assign meanings to the words and use them for private long-distance cable transactions. Judge Hand asked whether these
coined words qualified as writings under the Constitution. For Hand,
the critical issue was whether a writing had to have a predetermined
meaning. If so, the code book could not be copyrighted.6 6 But, Hand
argued:
Not all words communicate ideas; some are mere spontaneous ejaculations. Some are used for their sound alone, like nursery jingles....
Conceivably there may arise a poet who strings together words without
rational sequence ...
through whose beauty, cadence, meter, and
rhyme he may seek to make poetry. ....

Works of plastic art need not be pictorial. They may be merely
67
patterns, or designs, and yet they are within the statute.
He concluded, "If .

.

. models or paintings are 'writings,' I can see no

reason why words should not be such because they communicate nothing." 68 Judge Hand might better have concluded that there was no reason why they could not be copyrighted because they communicated
nothing in particular. Reiss stands not for the proposition that copyrightable writings need not be communicative or expressive in function,
but for the much more narrow proposition that to qualify as a writing
the work need not have a designated meaning which it communicates.
programming language, the right to add features to the program, and the right to make
other transformations necessary to make the program fulfill the user's needs. CONTU
FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
63. The CONTU Final Report, supra note 5, has been treated by courts as a statement of the legislative intent behind the 1980 Act. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l,
Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 781 (C.D. Cal. 1983). Some commentators have questioned the appropriateness of adopting the CONTU Final Report as legislative history. See Elman &
Moskowitz, Comment on the Third Circuit'sDecision in Apple v. Franklin, 2 COMPUTER

L. REP.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

391, 392 (1983).
276 F. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.
276 F. at 718.
Id.
Id. at 719.
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Just as it is absurd to ask for the meaning of a Joan Miro painting or a
jazz improvisation, so we cannot require, as a constitutional matter, that
literary works be representational or otherwise "meaningful" to qualify
69
for copyright protection.
While CONTU's ultimate position remains uncertain, it never
maintained that a copy of a computer program need not communicate
its copyrighted expression to a human audience. Rather, the CONTU
Final Report indicates that programs (fixed in whatever form) must
perform some communicative function to qualify for copyright protection.70 But CONTU refused to limit copyright protection to those programs which produced copyrightable output. To exclude programs
which performed useful functions "would be inconsistent with the design of the Act of 1976 which was clearly to protect all works of authorship from the moment of their fixation in any tangible medium of
expression." 7 1 Nevertheless, CONTU's description of the ways in which
a copyrighted work could be infringed suggests its intention that to be
copyrightable a work must be capable of being perceived by the program user:
A computer program may be misappropriated in a variety of ways. In
the first and most straightforward instance, the program listing or the
programmer's original coding sheets might be photocopied, which
would clearly be an infringement. The unarguably copyrightable writing has been taken. But, what if the program, rather than being recorded on paper, is recorded on magnetic tape or disk? If the tape is
used without authorization to produce a printed, human-readable version of the program, again an infringement has occurred. Should the
result be different if the tape is copied? That copy may still be used to
prepare a printed version at will. There is a one-to-one correspondence
between the printed characters on paper and the magnetized areas of
the tape. The tape is simply a version of the program from which a
human-readable copy may be produced with the aid of a machine or
72
device.
69. This would support the argument that machine code, though unintelligible, is
copyrightable.
70. In distinguishing programs from mere machine parts, the Commission compared
programs with videotapes and phonograph records and announced that:
All three types of work are capable of communicating with humans to a far
greater extent than the coined words discussed by Judge Hand in Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau. In all three instances, the medium in which copyrighted material is stored is moved past a sensing device at a set speed, causing
electric current to flow, and ultimately resulting in the movement of machine
parts to print words, display pictures, or create sounds.
CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 21 (emphasis in original).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 22.
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When is a version of a program not a copy for copyright purposes? According to CONTU:
Only when the program is inserted-instruction for instruction-into
the processing element of the computer and electrical impulses are sent
through the circuitry of the processor to initiate work is the ability to
copy lost ....
If it should be possible to tap off these impulses then,
appropriated, and no inperhaps, the process would be all that was
73
fringement of the copyright would occur.
The ability to make a human-readable version is critical in CONTU's

view. Only when that ability is lost, presumably at the stage where the
program actually controls the computer's functioning, would a version

74
of the program not qualify as a copyright-protected copy.
Is a version of a copyrighted program considered a copy, and therefore protected against infringement, when it is merely capable of producing human-readable version, or must it do so in the ordinary course
of use? Neither CONTU nor the definitions of "copy" and copyright
subject matter provided in the 1976 Act answer this question. The answer, if any, must be found in the policies and values behind our copyright law.
Since it is technically possible to "break into" any medium of fixation and retrieve the program code, it could be that any instantiation of
a computer program could itself qualify as a protected copy. This interpretation of the communication requirement comports well with a policy of protecting computer programs as items which derive their value
from use and not as literary works to be read or viewed by the public.
It is also consistent with current copyright law which protects all writings from the moment of first fixation. A manuscript, hidden away in a
desk drawer, is as much protected by copyright as a best seller available
at every newsstand. There are practical reasons for extending copyright
protection to copy-protected versions of a program. Many fear that revealing the underlying programs to computer users will only promote
infringement in a technology where it is far easier and less expensive to
make illicit copies than to purchase legitimate ones in the market. Enforcement of the copyright laws against such infringers is next to impossible. But extending copyright protection to copies of a program
from which the copyrighted expression cannot be perceived in the normal course of its use is tantamount to using copyright law to protect
what remains essentially a trade secret. Though the unpublished manu-

73. Id.
74. While CONTU's analysis of the electronic processes taking place in the computer
leaves something to be desired-the program embedded in a disk or on ROM can only be
copied by transforming the program into a series of electrical signals and, in a sense, tapping them off-the example was intended to distinguish the copyrightable program from

the use of the program which cannot be enjoined under the rule of Baker v. Selden.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VI

script is nominally protected under copyright law, its owner reaps no
benefit from that protection until she makes it public. 75 The computer
software vendor who uses her copyright to obtain a monopoly on the
sale of a program while preventing purchasers from gaining access to
the program code itself, is using copyright law to ensure financial gain
where trade secret protection alone would fail.
The limited monopoly granted to authors under copyright law has a
quid pro quo-the public benefit. Unitl now, that public benefit clearly
has been the creation and dissemination of new creative expression and
the ideas and useful learning it embodies. With computer programs
there is a sharp bifurcation between the benefits the public reaps from
being able to use the work and from being able to read the program.
While we are accustomed to thinking of computer programs as useful
articles, there is also enormous public benefit to be gained from publishing programs and making the knowledge and techniques contained
therein available to other programmers and program users. Program
writing, after all, is itself a useful art that may be promoted by publishing examples for study as well as use. Computer programming is no
longer the exclusive territory of a specialized group called computer
scientists. Children, college students, executives, and others are writing
programs in more than a dozen computer languages and dialects. This
enormous growth in what is called "computer literacy" suggests that
computer programs are more than mere tools which can be employed
without the need to understand them. They are a new form of expression, of conceptualizing and solving practical problems, and of communicating ideas. 76 Copyright used to enforce trade secret protection for
computer programs would stifle this development at tremendous social
cost. Certainly, extending copyright protection to copies of programs
which are copy-protected would undermine the policy behind section
117 of the 1980 Act which explicitly allows owners of copies of a computer program to adapt and copy the program. CONTU, in recommending adoption of section 117 by Congress, broadly interpreted the
rights of the owner of a copy of a computer program. 77 In order to ex75. The 1976 Act states that copyright "subsists" in works of authorship from the moment of fixation in a tangible medium of expression, thereby eliminating the publication
requirement that was a prerequisite for federal copyright protection under the 1909 Act.

One reason for this change was to avoid the frequent and vexatious litigation over when
publication first occurred. It is arguable that the copyright statute no longer makes public
dissemination a quid pro quo for copyright protection; however, the financial rewards
made available to the author by the copyright system can only be realized if the author
does publish the work.
76. COMPUTER LITERACY: IssuEs AND DIRECTIONS FOR 1985 (R. Anderson, B. Hunter,
R. Seidel eds. 1982).
77. Because of the lack of complete standardization among programming languages and hardware in the computer industry, one who rightfully acquires a
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ercise those rights, the owner of a copy of the program must have direct
access to the program code.
In that delicate balancing of public and private benefits which underlies all of copyright law, the scales ought to be tipped in favor of the
public. 78 At issue here is not the creation and dissemination of computer programs per se, but the form in which they are published. If
programs are sold in copies from which the program code can be obtained only at great expense or effort, the public effectively loses access
to that copyrighted expression for all purposes other than use in conjunction with a computer. Even that use is limited because users cannot
modify the program to serve their individual needs. What the copyright
owner gains from the sale of copy-protected versions of the program is
an extra edge in preventing copyright infringement. That copy-protection will not deter commercial competitors from discovering and even
replicating the program. At most it will prove useful against individuals
who make extra copies of a program for non-commercial uses.
The policy question which must be addressed by Congress and the
courts is whether copyright law will protect computer programs simply
because they are useful articles, using the copyrighted literary expression solely to identify the protected work, or whether it will limit copyright protection to works which not only contain but also make public
the protected expression. Some guidelines can be obtained from the
treatment of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works in the 1976 Act.
Useful articles are not copyrightable. 79 A useful article is "an article
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information. 8 0 Under the 1976
Act, the design of a useful article will be protected by copyright "if, and
only to the extent that, such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capacopy of a program frequently cannot use it without adapting it to that limited ex-

tent which will allow its use in the possessor's computer. The copyright law,
which grants to copyright proprietors the exclusive right to prepare translations,
transformations, and adaptations of their work, should no more prevent such use
than it should prevent rightful possessors from loading programs into their computers. Thus, a right to make those changes necessary to enable the use for
which it was both sold and purchased should be provided. The conversion of the
program from one higher-level language to another to facilitate use would fall
within this right, as would the right to add features to the program that were not
present at the time of rightful acquisition. These rights would necessarily be
more private in nature than the right to load a program by copying it and could
only be exercised so long as they did not harm the interests of the copyright
proprietor.
CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 13 (footnote omitted).
78. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (copyright monopoly
must ultimately serve the public good by promoting broad public availability).

79. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "useful article").
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ble of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article." 8'
Computer programs, when placed in a computer, are useful articles.
They perform work. The program itself, however, is literary in nature.
As a literary work it is subject to copyright protection. The statutory
treatment of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works suggests that computer programs should be protected only insofar as they are separable
from their utilitarian use. Copies of programs that perform useful work
but which do not independently display or otherwise allow access to the
program itself would be treated as useful articles outside the scope of
copyright protection.
Machine-usable versions of a computer program are copyright-protected copies of that program to the extent that the source code is reproduced in the machine code and the program can be "reproduced,
perceived, or otherwise communicated" to the human user of the program.8 2 Policy considerations suggest that machine code versions that
prevent access to the program code in the normal course of use be denied protection under copyright law. But within these strictures, it appears that machine code programs are fully copyrightable and that a
copyright in the original source code will protect the machine code program as well.
III.

COMPUTER PROGRAMS AS UTILITARIAN OBJECTS:
RETHINKING BAKER v. SELDEN
A.

THE UTILITARIAN OBJECT PROBLEM

The 1980 Act defines a computer program as a "set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result.8 3 Some programs function to produce
copyrightable output, others control computer operations, and yet
others are used to run machinery from robots to microwave ovens.
Should programs be distinguished according to these functions and
granted differential copyright protection on that basis?
A computer standing alone can do nothing. Computer programs
transform that general purpose machine into a specific machine, one
that can perform spreadsheet analyses, create a painting, or act as a control device for an industrial robot.8 4 In this sense, all programs are
81. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
Copyright protection

extends to

pictorial,

graphic, or sculptural works which

are

"reproduce[d] in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise." 17 U.S.C.
§ 113(a) (1982).
82. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
84. Oxman, supra note 41, at 431 ("The ROM is what makes the computer in question
unique. The ROM . .. amounts to a permanent on-board program which transforms a
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blueprints for machines. But the program is not only a blueprint. It
performs the dual function of blueprint for the special purpose machine
it creates and the means by which that machine operates. Viewed from
this perspective, computer programs appear much more like machines
than copyrightable writings.
Many are unconcerned by the machine-like nature of computer
programs. The CONTU majority based its strong support of copyright
protection for computer programs on the grounds that:
[Programs] are used in an almost limitless number of ways to release
human beings from such diverse mundane tasks as preparing payrolls,
monitoring aircraft instruments, taking data readings, making calculations for research, setting type, operating assembly lines, and taking inventory. . . . For both economic and humanitarian reasons, it is
undesireable for people to carry out manually the process described in
painstaking detail in a computer program. Machines, lacking human
attributes, cannot object to carrying out repetitious, boring, and tedious
tasks. Because machines can and do perform these tasks, people are
free to do those other things which they alone can do or in which they
85
find a more rewarding expenditure of their efforts.
Some courts argue that Congress, in adopting the amendments recommended by CONTU, also adopted CONTU's view that copyright protection should extend to all computer programs regardless of their
function.8 6 The position that utilitarian use does not preclude copyright
protection also finds support in the Supreme Court opinion in Mazer v.
Stein8 7 which stated, in dicta, that "nothing in the copyright statute...
[supports] the argument that the intended use or use in industry of an
article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration. 8 8s Since
programs are copyrightable as literary works, their use in a computer,
potentially general-purpose machine (the microcomputer with an unprogrammed ROM)
into a special purpose machine."); see also Gemignani, Should Algorithms Be Patentable?,

23 JURIMETRICS J. 326, 331 (1982).
85. CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 10.

86. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1984)
("As recommended by the CONTU majority, the [1980] Act makes no distinction between
the copyrightability of those programs which directly interact with the computer user and
those which simply manage the computer system."); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983) ("[W]e can consider the CONTU Report as accepted by Congress since Congress wrote into the law the majority's recommendation almost verbatim. . . . the statutory definition of a computer program ... makes no
distinction between application programs and operating programs") (citations omitted);

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 781 (C.D. Cal. 1983) ("It is
crystal-clear that CONTU recommended that all computer programs . . . be included
within copyright protection. There likewise can be no doubt but that Congress accepted

that recommendation and embodied it in the 1980 amendments to the Copyright law.")
(emphasis in original).

87. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
88. Id. at 218.
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whatever the intended result, should not divest them of copyright
protection.
Yet there are others who remain uncomfortable with this position.
Commissioner Nimmer, in his concurring opinion in the CONTU Final
Report, suggested that computer programs be distinguished according to
their results; programs that control automobile fuel injection systems,
temperature levels in buildings, or traffic signals would not be eligible
for copyright protection.,8 9 Nimmer believed such a distinction necessary to prevent the Copyright Act from becoming "a general misappropriation law, applicable as well in what has traditionally been regarded
as the patent arena, and, indeed, also in other areas to which neither
copyright nor patent law has previously extended." 9 A similar functional distinction has been suggested in recent litigation over the
copyrightability of operating system programs, the programs which control the computer's internal operations.9 1
Computer programs can be divided into three basic types according
to their function. "Type I" programs (applications programs) allow the
user to perform "intellectual" work. These programs usually produce
copyrightable output in the form of written text, graphic displays, or
even musical compositions. "Type 2" programs (operating system programs) produce no recognizable output. They run the computer, allowing it to receive input from a keyboard or other peripheral device,
display output, translate higher level programming languages into
machine-usable code, and perform other similar tasks.92 Without such
programs, the computer would be a useless piece of hardware. "Type 3"
programs, like type 1 programs, produce identifiable output, but the
output is "physical" work instead of "intellectual" work. Type 3 programs may be used in general purpose computers or special purpose devices to control microwave ovens, traffic lights, and to control feedback
systems in chemical and industrial processes.
No court has yet addressed the question of whether type 3 programs are fully copyrightable. Only a few courts have considered the
89. CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 27.

90. Id at 26.
91. In both Apple v. Franklin and Apple v. Formula, the defendants argued that the
operating system programs which they allegedly had copied were not copyrightable under
the 1976 and 1980 Acts. They based their claim on the fact that, unlike applications programs, operating system programs control the internal operations of the computer and

therefore are utilitarian processes or methods of operation and that they do not communicate directly with the computer user. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Corp., 725
F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir. 1983). See also, Brief for Appellee at 25, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), reprinted in 1 COMPUTER L. REP. 681, 691-92
(1983).
92. See supra note 18.
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copyrightability of type 2, operating system, programs. One recent case,
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.93 merits close examination both because of the effect that case will have on future litigation
and because the arguments raised on both sides must be taken into account in any determination of the issue.
B.

OPERATING SYSTEM PROGRAMS: APPLE V. FRANKLIN

In Apple Computer, Inc., v. FranklinComputer Corp.94 the heart of
the defendant's argument was that Apple's copyright on its operating
system programs gave it a monopoly on the machine that runs Applecompatible software. Franklin claimed that the operating system programs constituted a process, procedure, or method of operation excluded from copyright protection under section 102(b) of the 1976 Act. 95
By obtaining a copyright on these programs, Apple effectively was able
to prevent anyone else from creating a computer capable of running the
numerous applications programs developed by third party programmers
to run on the Apple machine. This monopolization of a machine (and
its software) was possible, Franklin alleged, because there were only a
limited number of ways to write an operating system that could run Apple-compatible software. 96 This merger of "idea" and "expression", of
operating system and program code, made it possible for Apple to use
its copyright in the program codes to create an impermissible monopoly
in a computer system.
Apple's position, in defense of its copyright, was that there is no adequate way to distinguish applications programs (type 1) from operating
system programs (type 2) since both make the computer perform
93.. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed,
104 S.Ct. 690 (1984).
94. Id.
95. The relevant statutory language is reprinted in the text accompanying note 100,
infra.
96. The factual dispute over how many ways a program can be written to achieve the
same result has not been fully addressed by any court. CONTU received testimony that
there are, in principle, a near infinite number of ways to write any program. CONTU,
FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 20 n.106. In Apple v. Franklin,Apple did not try to argue
that its operating system programs could be rewritten to achieve Apple-software compatibility, but merely argued that many different operating system programs could be written
for the Apple computer. See Elman & Moskowitz, A Personal View of the Apple v.
Franklin Appellate Arguments-A Hundred Minutes on Software Copyright,1 COMPUTER
L. REP. 901, 904 (1983). In Apple v. Formula, Apple's witness admitted that the operating
system programs could be rewritten to achieve 98% compatibility with Apple computers.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Corp., 562 F. Supp. 775, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affd,
725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). But, in Apple v. Franklin, Franklin's witness said that no
rewritten operating system could achieve 100% compatibility. Brief of Appellee at 20, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), reprinted in
1 COMPUTER L. REP. 681, 695 (1983). See infra note 128.
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work.97 Since both are utilitarian and both work together to bring
about a given result for the computer user, both may be classified as
processes or methods of operation. To attempt to draw a line between
the two types of programs would be to question the copyrightability of
all computer programs. According to Apple, it would be better to allow
copyright protection for all programs than to risk undermining Congress' clear intent to provide copyright protection for at least some
programs.
The Third Circuit, in upholding the copyrightability of Apple's operating system programs, agreed with Apple that applications and operating system programs are indistinguishable and denied that either type
of program constitutes a process, system, or method of operation excluded from protection under section 102(b) of the Copyright Act. Citing the CONTU majority report, the court argued:
Since it is only the instructions which are protected, a "process" is no
more involved because the instructions in an operating system program
may be used to activate the operation of the computer than it would be
if instructions were written in ordinary English in a manual which described the necessary steps to activate an intricate complicated
machine. There is, therefore, no reason to afford any less copyright
protection to the instructions in an operating system program than to
98
the instructions in an application program.
As to Franklin's argument, the court denied that there was any merger
of idea (that of running Apple-compatible software) and expression (the
operating system programs) by refusing to accept Franklin's position
that running Apple-compatible software was the relevant "idea":
The idea which may merge with the expression, thus making the copyright unavailable, is the idea which is the subject of the expression.
The idea of one of the operating system programs is, for example, how
to translate source code into object code. If other methods of expressing that idea are not foreclosed as a practical matter, then there is no
merger. Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility with independently developed application programs written for the Apple II, but
that is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter
into the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and
expressions have merged.9 9
How do the positions taken by the parties and court in Apple v.
Franklin comport with copyright law under the 1976 and 1980 Acts? To
answer this question it is necessary to look at section 102(b) of the 1976
97. Appellant's Opening Brief at 30-33, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) reprintedin 1 COMPUTER L. REP. 655, 674-75 (1983).
98. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251 (3d Cir.
1984).
99. Id. at 1253.

1985]

SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Act and the origins of the rule that copyright protection does not extend to utilitarian objects.
C.

THE RULE OF BAKER v. SELDEN

Section 102(b) of the 1976 Act completes the statutory definition of
copyright subject matter with an exclusionary clause: "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."10 This section is
unbending in its denial of copyright protection for any work or any part
thereof which is an idea, procedure, or method of operation regardless
of whether it would otherwise qualify as a copyrightablewriting. In explaining the applicability of this provision to computer programs, the
House of Representatives reported that:
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information
revealed by the author's work. It pertains to the literary[,] musical,
graphic, or artistic form in which the author expressed intellectual
concepts....
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should extend protection to the methodology or processes
adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the "writing" expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to
make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes
or methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of the
copyright law.
Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the
context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic
dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.'
What then are the ideas, methods, processes, or systems excluded from
copyright protection under section 102(b), and how are we to distinguish
the programmer's expression from the idea that is expressed?
The fundamental axiom that copyright does not cover processes,
methods, systems, or other utilitarian works has its root in the Supreme
Court decision in Baker v. Selden. 0 2 In that case, the Court considered
respondent's book explaining a new accounting system with examples
showing the arrangement of columns and headings necessary to employ
the system. The Court held that Selden could copyright the description
or explanation of his accounting system but not the "ruled lines and
100. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
101. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5670.
102. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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headings" of the T-accounts since they were necessary for the use of the
system.10 3 "Though Baker v. Selden stands for several fundamental
principles,"1 04 it is generally conceded that, at minimum, the case
stands for the proposition that a copyright on a description or explanation of a system, process, method, or other useful art cannot confer a
monopoly on the use of the system itself. 10 5 Thus, the Court in Baker
explained that a book on the "composition and use of medicines" or on
"the construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or churns" cannot
confer an exclusive right in the author to make medicines, ploughs,
watches, or churns according to the explanation in the book. 0 6 The
policy behind this distinction goes to the heart of the copyright clause of
the Constitution: "The very object of publishing a book on science or
the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge
which it contains. But this object would be frustrated if the knowledge
07
could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.'
Such exclusive rights to employ the art would effectively allow patent
rights to be obtained without the rigorous registration and other requirements of the patent system.
The distinction between use and explanation seems clear when applied to the physical arts and sciences like medicine or plough-making
but it becomes murky in cases like Baker itself where the practice of
the art described entails the reproduction of the exact words, illustrations, or charts contained in the copyrighted book. In Baker, the
Supreme Court held that copyright would not extend to those parts of
the copyrighted work necessary for the practice of the art, declaring:
And where the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the
methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public; not given
103. Id. at 105. ("The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of
copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one
is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright.
The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters-patent.")
104. Franklin argued before the Third Circuit that Baker v. Selden stands for three
distinct propositions:
First, Baker teaches that use of a system itself does not infringe a copyright on
the description of the system. Second, Baker enunciates the rule that copyright
does not extend to purely utilitarian works. Finally, Baker emphasizes that the
copyright laws may not be used to obtain and hold a monopoly over an idea.
Baker highlights the principal difference between the copyright and patent
laws--a difference that is highly pertinent in this case.
Brief for Appellee at 22, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240
(3d Cir.), reprinted in 1 CoMpuTER L. REP. 681, 696 (1983).
105. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18(B) (1978).
106. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 102.
107. Id. at 103.

1985]

SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

for the purpose of publication in other works
explanatory of the art,
l08
but for the purpose of practical application.
On this basis, the Court held Selden's T-account forms uncopyrightable.
Closely aligned with the rule of Baker v. Selden is the rule that
copyright protects only the author's expression and not the idea which
the author expresses. Thus, "[w]hen the 'idea' and its 'expression' are
. . .inseparable, copying the 'expression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such circumstances would confer a monopoly
of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free of the conditions and limitations imposed by patent law." 10 9 The rule that copyright in an explanation, description, or other expression of a useful system will not extend
to the use of that system and the rule that where an idea can be expressed in only a limited number of ways no copyright will be allowed
to create a monopoly in that idea are conceptually different and require
different inquiries. 110 Where computer programs are at issue, these
rules must be applied in a two-step process. The first step is to determine, under Baker, whether the program is utilitarian and, if so, what
its particular function is (that is, what system, method, or process it performs). The second step is to see how many programs could be written
to express that same system, method, or process without infringing the
copyright in the first program.
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,"' the Third
Circuit held that an operating system should be defined in broadly functional terms, as a system to "translate source code into object code" and
not, for instance, to translate a specific source code language into the
machine code appropriate for a given computer architecture. 11 2 Since
the operating system was defined in only general terms, the Third Circuit found no merger between the program's expression (the sequence
of instructions) and the "idea" or function of the program. The court
concluded that since many different programs could be written to process properly configured applications programs, it was not necessary for
Franklin to copy or closely replicate Apple's operating system programs
113
in order to create its own system.
In

deciding that Apple's operating system programs

could be

108. Id.
109. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
110. Baker has been interpreted as granting copyright protection "only for the expression of the idea-not the idea itself." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). The Baker
court, however, never mentioned an idea-expression dichotomy; instead, it distinguished

between description or explanation and use. Nevertheless, the word "idea" has become a
generic term encompassing all the exceptions to copyright protection contained in § 102(b)
of the 1976 Act.
111. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
112. Id. at 1253.
113. 1d
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treated as generic systems, the Third Circuit relied on the test for distinguishing between copyright-protected artistic expression and unby Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v.
copyrightable ideas developed
i4
i

Universal Pictures Corp:

Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prewhich, apart from their expression, his
vent the use of his "ideas," to
5
property is never extended."1
Thus, the Third Circuit applied a test intended for deciding the scope of
an author's expression in a literary work to determine the process,
method, or system of which Apple's operating system program was an
expression. In applying this test, the Court failed to recognize that the
idea-expression test is appropriate only as a second-level inquiry where
utilitarian works are concerned. The system or method which the program "expresses" must first be determined, as an examination of the
Baker decision and its progeny makes clear.
In Baker, the plaintiff had developed a "peculiar" bookkeeping system in that it allowed one to present the "entire operation of a day, a
week, or a month, on a single page, or on two pages facing each
other. 11 i 6 The system was by no means the only available bookkeeping
system, nor did it monopolize the art of bookkeeping. It was, to say the
least, one among many alternative bookkeeping systems, a fact demonstrated by defendant Baker's ability to achieve the same results using
different account forms. The Supreme Court denied Selden a copyright
in the account forms not on the ground that such a copyright would
prevent either bookkeeping in general or the best method of bookkeeping, but instead denied the copyright because granting it would prevent
the use of Selden's own bookkeeping system, his invention, which he
had dedicated to the public by publishing it without first obtaining a
patent on the system.117 The Supreme Court never subjected Selden's
accounting system to scrutiny to see if it monopolized some more ge114. Id., citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
115. Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d at 121 (citation omitted).
116. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1879).
117. Id. at 104. Some, relying on subsequent cases such as Brown Instrument Co. v.
Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947) and Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Frost Co., 139
F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), have read Baker to deny a copyright for Selden's T-account forms
because they lacked copyrightable expression. But the Baker court never gave such a basis for its decision. Judge Newcomer in his opinion in Apple v. Franklin,invoked what he
called the "Baker-Taylor" doctrine, claiming that copyright lies only in that which teaches

or explains and not that which is intended for use. 545 F. Supp. at 821.
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neric bookkeeping function. The Court took Selden's system as such
and only then asked whether there was an impermissible merger of the
system (use) with the expression (account forms) adopted by the
author.
A glance at other cases dealing with utilitarian writings in which,
unlike the Baker case, the use of the system was inseparable from the
copyrighted expression, 118 confirms that the system or method expressed in a writing is not subject to further abstraction by the court.
In Crume v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. ,119 the court considered
the alleged infringement of four pamphlets describing a "plan or
method by which insolvent life insurance companies may be reorganized through mutualization and readjustment of liabilities.' 120 The
court undertook no inquiry to determine whether there were other
methods by which life insurance companies could be saved from bankruptcy or whether there were other possible plans for "mutualization
and readjustment of liabilities." Rather, the court proceeded directly to
the question of whether the words contained in plaintiff's pamphlets
were necessary for the use of the specific plan contained in these pamphlets. Though the court found the defendant's work had sufficient dissimilarity to avoid the charge of infringement, it set out a rule limiting
any copyright in any language that set forth such a plan where the plan
12 1
could be effected solely by the use of the words descriptive thereof.
118. In Baker, the T-account forms were entirely separable from the text describing
how to use the new accounting system. The Second Circuit has distinguished Baker in
cases where the copyrighted work contains copyrightable expression inextricably intertwined with the "writings" necessary for the use of the system described. See Continental
Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1958); Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Other courts have not
made this distinction, a distinction which appears to have little practical effect on the outcome of the case.
119. 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944).
120. 1& at 182.
121. [P]laintiff recognizes defendant's right to the use of the plan or method
taught by plaintiff, but denies to the defendant the right to use the words necessary to effect such use. It appears to us that the concession is inconsistent with
the denial. Plaintiff attempts to compare the instant situation with books containing plans and descriptions for houses, or plans for formal gardens, or plans
for interior decoration. In such instances, however, the disclosure of the plan
may be put to use by the utilization of material, tools, and equipment in the
hands of the mechanic or workman. The use to which the public is entitled is
effected by means other than the embodiment of words. In the instant situation
there is no room for the skill of the mechanic or artisan in utilizing the plan or
the method disclosed. Its use, to which the public is entitled, can be effected
solely by the employment of words descriptive thereof. In our view, where the
use can be effected only in such manner, there can be no infringement even
though the plan or method be copied. We realize that such a view leaves little, if
any, protection to the copyright owner; in fact, it comes near to invalidating the
copyright. This situation, however, results from the fact that the practical use of
the art explained by the copyright and lodged in the public domain can be at-
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Similarly, in Morrissey v. Proctor& Gamble Co.,122 the court recognized that a sweepstakes based on social security numbers was an uncopyrightable system. It did not engage in an inquiry as to alternative
types of sweepstakes, based, for instance, on telephone numbers, but
asked only if there was a merger between the idea (the specific sweepcontained in plaintiff's copyrighted
stakes system) and the expression
123
rules for the sweepstakes contest.
Operating system programs, such as the plans in Crume and the
sweepstakes rules in Morrissey, are classified under copyright law as literary works. 124 The programs, like the rules at issue in Morrissey, both
describe how the system functions and are necessary to bring about that
functioning. Given the legislative admonition that "the expression
adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer
program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the pro1 25
the Third Cirgram are not within the scope of the copyright law,"'
cuit should have accepted Franklin's contention that the operating
system at issue was the specific system developed by Apple, the system
that ran Apple-compatible software. Then, and only then, could the
question arise whether and to what extent Apple's copyright in its programs should be limited to allow others to use the system. The Third
Circuit made no finding as to whether there was a substantial merger of
idea and expression in Apple's programs, leaving that for determination
126
by the trial court on remand.
In the case of computer programs, especially operating system programs, the question of how many ways a given system can be written is
particularly difficult. Operating system programs are designed in terms
of the physical organization-the architecture-of the computer. They
are the interface between the computer and the applications programs
which run on the computer to make it perform specific tasks for the
computer user. Though there are many different operating system programs which can be written for a given architecture, any given applications program will be designed to run with one, and usually only one,
operating system. While Apple presented testimony that an operating
system could be produced which would be ninety-eight percent compatitained solely by the employment of language which gives expression to that
which is disclosed.
Id. at 184.
122. 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
123. See id. at 678-79.
124. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5667.
125. Id. at 5670.
126. Apple v. Franklin was settled before further court proceedings. As part of the
settlement agreement, Franklin promised to develop its own operating system programs
to run Apple-compatible software. See 2 COMPUTER L. REP. 553 (1984).
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ble with Apple-compatible software, 12 the difference between ninetyeight percent and one hundred percent compatibility may be enormous
when the reliability of software programs run on the system is at issue. 128 It may be that nothing short of one hundred percent compatibility is acceptable within the industry, and that such compatibility is
attainable only by wholly or substantially copying the programs developed, in this instance, by Apple.
Some might argue that the rule of Baker v. Selden has been taken
too far. All that Baker says is that the copyright owner cannot prevent
the use of the system described in the copyrighted work. 129 The operative question should be who can use the system, not what system can be
used. Under the interpretation of Baker, Selden could prevent everyone from using his system except legitimate purchasers of his book.
They had paid the royalty price for access to his system, and he could
not legitimately prevent them from reproducing his T-account forms for
their own use, since to do so would render their investment in his book
worthless. Under this interpretation, the vendor and copyright owner
of a computer program could not prevent the legitimate purchaser of a
copy of the program from using it in his computer, even if such use required the user to copy the program in manner that would otherwise
violate the copyright owner's monopoly rights. Section 117, introduced
by the 1980 Act, explicitly allows the owner of a copy of a program to
make a copy or adaptation of the program if it is "an essential step in
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
130
machine."
But the rule of Baker v. Selden cannot be so narrowly confined.
The Baker court itself made no distinction between legitimate owners
of copies of Selden's book and others who could be rightfully excluded
from using the system embodied in his T-account forms. On the contrary, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the "copyright of a book
on bookkeeping cannot secure the exclusive right to make, sell, and use
127. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 782 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
128. Franklin included the following testimony in its brief before the Third Circuit:
On rebuttal, Mr. Sander [Apple's witness] asserted that it would be possible to
rewrite the Autostart ROM program, for example. However, he conceded that
after such rewriting, the computer would not be able to run all of the Apple-compatible software and achieve total compatibility. As Franklin's Mr. Borden
pointed out, reaching less than 100 percent of the market is like making a roof
that keeps a house dry less than 100 percent of the time. Obviously, that is not a
viable alternative, particularly since it would be impossible to predict which of
the thousands of Apple-compatible application programs would be unable to run
on an alternate machine.
Brief for Appellee at 20, Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240

(3d Cir. 1983), reprinted in 1 COMPUTER L. REP. 681, 695 (1983)(citations omitted).
129. M. NIMMER, supra note 105, at § 2.18[C].
130. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1982).
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account-books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book." 13 1 Likewise, in Morrissey, the alleged infringer was not a good faith purchaser.
The defendant in that case had rejected plaintiff's offer to sell the
rights to use his copyrighted sweepstakes rules. 132 Under Baker and its
progeny, anyone can use a system, once published, and anyone can copy
an author's expression if that expression is necessary in order to utilize
the system.
But what of Apple's claim that applications programs and operating
system programs are indistinguishable, and that any limitation on the
copyrightability of operating system programs would prevent effective
copyright protection for all computer programs? Is it possible to distinguish applications programs so that they can be protected under copyright law as many believe they should?
Applications programs, like operating system programs, are utilitarian. They allow the computer user to perform a specific task. For instance, a user might choose a spreadsheet program to do her accounting
and record keeping or a graphics program with which to produce a picture, design, or animation. Applying the same two-step analysis as is
used with operating system programs, one must first determine the application program's function or use. In many cases, the program produces output which itself is copyrightable, such as an audiovisual
display, literary work, or it may produce a utilitarian work like a
spreadsheet or word-processing system. The second step is to determine
how many different programs could be written to produce the same output. Frequently, the answer will be many, many programs. Unlike operating system programs, which may be constrained by both the
computer's complex architecture and by the software already developed
to run on the pre-existing operating system, applications programs are
constrained only by the existing languages in which they can be written
and the specific results one wishes to achieve. It is easier to independently create a program that produces a specific result when that result
is a visible, user-interactive output than when the result is the coordination of existing software and the computer hardware, a task which requires the careful timing of electrical pulses as they pass through the
computer circuitry. To achieve the latter, it might be necessary to study
the existing operating system programs to discover "how it was done" in
order to develop one's own solution to the problem.133 Thus there is far
less opportunity for an applications programs to monopolize a given re131. 101 U.s. at 104.
132. 379 F.2d at 677.
133. Because an operating system program controls the operations of the computer
and the interconnections between the CPU and peripheral devices, the programmer must
trace and coordinate each electrical signal as it travels to and from the CPU. To replicate
such signals precisely enough to run software developed for other systems may be impos-
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sult than there is for an operating system to do so. Apple's fears that
all programs would become uncopyrightable if copyright protection for
operating system programs were limited seems unfounded.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the transformation from source to machine code
will not bar copyright protection for the machine code version of a program. However, that machine code version must be capable of communicating the copyright-protected expression to the program user if it is
to be protected as a copy of the original program. While, technically
speaking, the machine code version "contains" the protected expression,
that expression is, practically speaking, unintelligible. As a matter of
policy, the source code should be made available to purchasers of programs in order that they may have access to the copyrighted expression
and the ability to modify or adapt the program to their needs as provided by section 117 of the 1980 Act.
Nor does the fact that computer programs are useful articles bar
them from copyright protection. That they are utilitarian in nature
only subjects them to further scrutiny to insure that the copyright in
the program itself cannot be used to create a monopoly in the system,
process, or method of operation defined by the program. Where programs perform useful functions, it is the scope, not the fact, of copyright
protection which is at issue.
There is yet another aspect of computer programs that deserves attention. The copyrightable expression in a program extends beyond the
exact program code to the subroutines, procedures, and other functional
elements adopted by the programmer. It is possible that if we allow the
programmer to obtain copyright protection for these elements of his
program, we may be creating a monopoly in the basic techniques and
procedures of program construction, somewhat like allowing mathematicians to copyright particular equations or a painter to protect specific
brush techniques. The fact that copyright protects only copying and not
independent creation provides little solace for programmers and the development of programming science if courts are willing to find infringe1 34
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should be made for the copying and replication of specific elements, and
infringement should be found only if the copying involves a substantial
number of such elements in a similar sequence designed to bring about
the same results. That, and that alone, could protect the art of programming from atrophy due to the monopolization of the basic procedures and other processes that make up most if not all programs.
The computer program is radically different from traditional copyright subject matter. We are only beginning to recognize the extent and
implications of this difference. We will have to work out new approaches to this medium of expression so that, while providing the incentives called for under copyright policy, we do not allow authors to
establish monopolies over the utilitarian aspects of their programs,
either the results produced by the program or the procedures and methods employed by the programmer in writing the program. Because programs differ in their intended results and in their internal structure,
not all programs are created equal under copyright law. Some programs produce utilitarian output while others produce output which is
independently copyrightable. The former require greater scrutiny than
the latter, lest copyright preempt specific methods, systems, or
processes. Whether the program results in useful work or copyrightable expression, the nature of the program and the author's expression
in it must be carefully considered to prevent copyright from restricting
the techniques and methods of programming itself. Only by carefully
balancing the interest of the public and the interests of copyright proprietors will we be able to promote computer programs as a new useful
art and science.

